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Abstract 
Saving brings an economic loss. This is one of the basic propositions of the 
under-consumption theory. This paper aims to give a welfare economic 
foundation of this proposition through an optimization method considering 
money circulation in the case where a type of saving is limited to hoarding. 
If price is fixed, a non-hoarding state is a necessary condition for Pareto 
efficiency. However, individual agents who prefer future expenditure hoard 
money, thus individual rational behavior brings about a Pareto inefficient 
state. This irrationality of rationality occurs because of a qualitative 
difference of the budget constraint between the whole society and an 
individual agent. The former’s constraint incorporates a truth that hoarding 
decreases other’s revenue, whereas the latter’s does not. Selfish individual 
agents make a decision with an ignorance of this relational truth because 
their interest is limited to their private range. As a result, agents fall into 
an irrational situation despite their rational judgment. 
 
Keywords: Money Circulation, Welfare Economics, Under-Consumption, 
Paradox of Thrift, Intertemporal Choice. 
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1. Introduction 
Saving brings an economic loss even though it is often regarded as a 
virtue. This proposition, known as the paradox of thrift, is one of main 
elements of the under-consumption theory. This theory has been known 
since the early nineteenth century, and became popular especially in the 
interwar period (Haberler, 1964, pp.118-141; Klein, 1966, pp.124-152; Nash 
and Gramm, 1969; Bleaney, 1976; Dimand, 1991; Allgoewer, 2002; Clark, 
2008; Schneider, 2008).1 
The under-consumption theory based on recognition of money circulation 
was already attempted by some pioneers including Nicholas August Ludwig 
Jacob Johannsen (Hegeland, 1954, pp.5-14; Schneider, 1962, pp.131-134; 
Marget, 1964, pp.329-336; Allsbrock, 1986; Hagemann and Rühl, 1990; Rühl, 
2000), the pair of William Trufant Foster and Waddill Catchings (Gleason, 
1959; Carlson, 1962; Tavlas, 1976; Dimand, 2008a, 2008b), 2  and two 
German economists, Ferdinand Grünig and Carl Föhl (Pedersen, 1954, 
1957; Schneider, 1962, pp.156-159; Rothschild, 1964, pp.8-11; Ambrosi, 
1996).3 
The course of these pioneers is basically correct, but its precise foundation 
                                                   
1 The under-consumption theory was also spread in Japan of the day. In July 1932, 
when the Great Depression was attacking Japan, Takao Izeki wrote a little overdrawn 
comment as follows. “There is no person denying that a main cause of this current 
worldwide depression is a lack of purchasing power in a general consumption class.” 
(Izeki, 1932, p.210) Further, in May 1934, Yasuma Takata discussed the paradox of 
thrift while examining a denial of the paradox by Friedrich August von Hayek (Hayek, 
1931; Takata, 1934). 
2 The author owes a knowledge regarding Foster and Catchings largely to Sasahara 
(1981) written in Japanese. 
3 The author owes a knowledge regarding Föhl largely to Ito (1952) and Nagasawa 
(1968) written in Japanese. 
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still seems to be insufficient. The research of money circulation structure 
has been continued sometimes independently of the under-consumption 
theory. Above all, the money circulation equation by Mária Augustinovics in 
Hungary, which was invented to support a planned economy being affected 
by the economic input-output theory, is a valuable research work 
(Augustinovics, 1965). The author developed the equation in the preceding 
papers (Miura, 2014, 2015a). 
However, the money circulation equation is a pure description of the 
movement of money without pursuing the causes of the movement. Under-
consumption is an ethical problem of economic society, but mere description 
of the movement of money cannot give any evaluation criterion. For the 
foundation of under-consumption, we need another method. 
We think that a social evaluation criterion should be basically based on 
individual utility. The new welfare economics after Vilfredo Pareto provides 
a clear method to analyze this idea with using the concept of Pareto 
efficiency. For the sake of a normative analysis of a monetary economy, we 
need a method to connect a money circulation analysis with the welfare 
economics. This method is a money circulation optimization theory. We aim 
to construct this theory and authenticate the paradox of thrift. 
Our attempt can be regarded as a micro-foundation of the paradox of 
thrift. Recently, there exist some such research efforts including Christiano 
et al. (2011), Eggertsson (2011), Chamley (2011), Huo & Ríos-Rull (2013). 
However, they do not prove that saving brings a Pareto inefficient state. 
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The new welfare economics has usually been connected with the general 
equilibrium theory so far. This connection derives the first fundamental 
theorem of welfare economics, which insists that a market economy is 
realized as a Pareto efficient state (Arrow, 1951; Debreu, 1959, pp.90-97; 
Stiglitz, 1991; Blaug, 2007; Feldman, 2008). Against this theorem, an 
authentic under-consumption theory should clarify that saving causes a 
Pareto inefficient state. 
The following description by Paul Anthony Samuelson, who spread the 
term of the paradox of thrift on a contemporary economics, is notable. 
“The individual who saves cuts down on his consumption. He passes on less 
purchasing power than before. Therefore, someone else’s income is reduced. 
For one man’s outgo is another man’s income.” (Samuelson, 1948, p.271) 
Causality between saving and expenditure and revenue shown in this 
quotation is too important for understanding the paradox of thrift. We 
succeed to this recognition,4 but Samuelson’s limitation was that he could 
not found the paradox by welfare economics. 
For a foundation of under-consumption by expenditure optimization, the 
                                                   
4 However, we cannot approve the next sentences which follow the quotation in the text. 
“If one individual succeeds in saving more, it is because someone else is forced to 
dissave. If one individual succeeds in hoarding more money, someone else must do 
without.” (Samuelson, 1948, p.271) This seems to be affected by the following 
statement by John Maynard Keynes. “although the amount of his own saving is 
unlikely to have any significant influence on his own income, the reactions of the 
amount of his consumption on the incomes of others makes it impossible for all 
individuals simultaneously to save any given sums.” (Keynes, 1936, p.84) This idea is 
grounded on the identity between saving and investment, which Keynesians espouse. 
Yet, this proposition is incorrect. The existence of investment is not necessary for that 
of saving. In the following part of this paper, we will show it by proving that saving can 
exist without investment. 
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dual decision hypothesis by Robert Wayne Clower is also a remarkable 
contribution (Clower, 1965). It implies that realized revenue used in an 
expenditure optimization should not be regarded as being decided by a level 
of supply resources of commodities. Although this is a superior critique 
against the general equilibrium theory, a weak point of the hypothesis is 
that it does not clarify a decision principle of the realized revenue in lieu of 
supply resources. 
Robert Barro and Herschel Grossman developed the dual decision 
hypothesis through combining it with Don Patinkin’s analysis about labor 
markets and constructed the general disequilibrium model (Barro and 
Grossman, 1971). But their model only regards Clower’s realized revenue as 
labor supply and Patinkin’s revenue as labor demand. It does not clarify a 
cause of the realized revenue. 
Clower’s realized revenue ought to be connected with Samuelson’s 
preceding causality. In a monetary economy, the realized revenue is decided 
by a money flow from expenditure, whereas expenditure is affected by a 
money flow from revenue through a decision-making process under the 
budget constraint. A money circulation structure is composed of these 
bidirectional flows, and these flows bring bidirectional causalities between 
expenditure and revenue. Our money circulation optimization is a method to 
optimize expenditure while considering the bidirectional causalities.5 
 
                                                   
5 In order to understand the content of this paper easily, the author recommends that 
you preliminarily read Miura (2016), which he wrote as an introduction of this paper. 
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2. Basic Assumptions 
In this paper, we will discuss a primitive monetary economy. This 
primitive economy is not a faithful description of our monetary economy. 
However, for the purpose of clearly understanding the essence of the under-
consumption problem, we believe that it is appropriate to analyze a cause of 
under-consumption in a primitive economy as a primary approach. 
We will clarify a basic assumption of this paper. 
We decide that a target group for description is called the relevant society. 
The relevant society consists of finite number of agents. We give natural 
numbers to each agent of the relevant society. The relevant society is 
denoted by a set of agents as N={1,…,n}. 
The target term for description is called the relevant term. We assume 
that the relevant term is of finite length, thus the relevant term always has 
its term beginning and term end. The sphere which includes the relevant 
society and the relevant term is called the relevant space-time. 
We assume that money is always used in all exchanges in the relevant 
space-time. In other words, the world we discuss is a monetary economy. 
Barter trading does not exist in our assumed economy. 
We define expenditure as transferring money to the relevant space-time, 
and revenue as money being transferred from the relevant space-time. 
Further, we put a supposition that production and disappearance of money 
do not occur in the relevant space-time. We also suppose that money 
transfer between the relevant society and its outside does not exist in the 
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relevant term. By these suppositions, the money stock in the relevant space-
time is constant.6 
Note that there is an economic theory called the monetary circuit theory, 
which has been mainly developed by French and Italian economists. It 
shares our interest in respect of emphasizing circulation in order to 
understand a monetary economy. Another feature of the circuit theory is to 
emphasize credit creation and destruction of money by banks (Graziani, 
1990, pp.12-14; Deleplace and Nell, 1996, p.11; Rochon and Rossi, 2003, 
p.xxxiii). From this perspective, our supposition that money is constant may 
be hard to be justified. 
We do not deny that credit money is an important issue of a modern 
economy, but we believe that our supposition is justified as a primary 
approach for money circulation research. 
Perishable goods disappear as soon as they are used, thus production of 
the goods is worth consideration. Durable goods do not disappear for a long 
time, but often show deterioration with their use, thus production of the 
goods also needs to be considered. 
On the other hand, if money is used, it is only transferred to another 
agent and does not disappear. It does not show deterioration through the 
transfer, either. Hence, money can circulate for a long time. Circuit theorists 
recognize money circulation as a complete process from creation to 
destruction, but we do not know clearly when the circulation begins and 
                                                   
6 Strictly speaking, a further assumption is necessary for constancy of the money stock. 
See p.16 of this paper. 
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ends. Money circulation is a semi-permanent process, thus creation and 
destruction are not primary issues of the money circulation. Therefore, a 
primary research to inquire into the circulation should regard money as an 
eternal existence. 
Further, there is only one kind of consumption goods in our primitive 
economy. We assume that money transfer is limited to the transfer through 
the trading of consumption goods. Although the existence of production 
factors including labor is permitted, we suppose they are not traded. Our 
assumption can also be expressed that all agents in the relevant space-time 
are individual proprietors who sell only consumption goods. All other money 
transfers including tax payment and donation are assumed not to exist. 
Note that a type of saving we can treat is limited by this assumption. 
Phenomena which we usually call saving are commonly disposal methods of 
money which enable the future expenditure of a saver.7 This view of saving 
is based on an individual usage of an economic agent. However, if we pay 
attention to a social movement of money, we can classify savings into two 
different types. One type of saving is hoarding, which is not transferred 
while saving is executed. However, the other saving types including deposit, 
loan and equity investment are transferred from their owner to another 
agent while saving is executed. For this reason, we call the latter savings 
collectively transfer saving. People who are interested in movement of 
                                                   
7 This definition can be applied only for a saving of money. We can define saving of 
usual commodity similarly as a disposal method of commodity which enables the future 
use of a saver. However, this paper discusses only a saving of money. 
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money must notice this difference between the two savings.8 
Our assumption that money transfer is limited to the transfer for 
consumption goods eliminates the existence of transfer saving. A saving 
method in our primitive economy is limited to hoarding, which is the 
simplest method of saving. Even though transfer saving is an important 
element of a modern economy, our assumption that saving methods are 
limited to hoarding will enable us to understand a welfare economic essence 
of under-consumption phenomenon simply and clearly. 
Next, we introduce an idea of the disposal irreversibility principle. This 
represents that revenue can be expended neither before nor exactly at the 
same time when revenue is received. This principle is substantially the 
same as to reject a possibility of time travel into the past or exactly 
simultaneous teleportation. Since these possibilities are not approved by the 
present state of scientific knowledge (Gott, 2002; Davies, 2002; Nemiroff and 
Wilson, 2014), this is a scientifically justifiable principle. 
If we do not consider the disposal irreversibility principle, aporias which 
we named two missing problems are caused in a monetary budget constraint. 
We have to incorporate this principle into the budget constraint to avoid the 
aporias, as elaborately discussed in the author’s preceding paper (Miura, 
2015b). We will clarify this irreversibility budget constraint concretely based 
                                                   
8 Henry Abbati, who was an under-consumptionist acting in the interwar period, 
emphasized to distinguish between hoarding and transfer saving from an early day, 
though he was captured by a traditional prejudice which tends to identify transfer 
saving with investment (Abbati, 1924, p.101, n.2). The author owes a knowledge 
regarding Abbati’s this recognition to Kojima (1995, pp.122-123) written in Japanese. 
Also note that Dennis Holme Robertson comments on Abbati’s under-consumption 
theory in Robertson (1932). 
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on our supposition of the primitive economy.9 
Based on the disposal irreversibility principle, if the relevant term is 
divided into very short terms, revenue in the term cannot be expended in 
the same term. We call such a short term a basic-term. We give natural 
numbers to each basic-term. We set the numbers of basic-terms such that 
smaller numbers correspond to the earlier basic-terms and larger numbers 
correspond to later basic-terms. Note that the relevant term can be divided 
into finite basic-terms by the principle (Miura, 2014, pp.194-195; Miura, 
2015b, p.93, n.19). Based on this, the relevant term is denoted by a set of 
basic-terms as T={1,…,t}. 
The budget constraint of each agent is defined for every basic-term. 
Since we assume that money is not produced nor transferred from the 
outside, the budget of the first basic-term is limited to money which an 
agent possesses at the beginning of the relevant term. A part of the budget 
is expended. Considering our assumption that money does not disappear or 
is not transferred to the outside, we define the non-expended part of the 
budget as a hoarding (Miura, 2015b, p.94).10 Then, the budget constraint of 
Agent i in the first basic-term is denoted 
Xi(1)+Hi(1)=Ψi, 
where Ψi is a quantity of money which Agent i possesses at the beginning of 
                                                   
9 An idea of the irreversibility budget constraint was primitively suggested by Dennis 
Holme Robertson (Robertson, 1933; Keynes et al., 1933; Metzler, 1948; Van Eeghen, 
2014), and was developed by Sho Chieh Tsiang and others (Tsiang, 1966; Kohn, 1981; 
Kohn, 1988; Laidler, 1989). 
10 Based on the disposal irreversibility principle, non-expendable money in a basic-term 
cannot be included in the budget of the term even if it exists in the term. Accordingly, 
revenue in a basic-term cannot become hoarding in the same term. 
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the relevant term; Xi(v) is the expenditure quantity of Agent i in Basic-term 
v; and Hi(v) is the hoarding quantity of Agent i in Basic-term v. 
The hoarding in a basic-term becomes a part of the budget in the following 
basic-term. The budget also includes revenue received in the preceding 
basic-term. Components of the budget are limited to these two because we 
suppose that money is not produced nor transferred from the outside. Then, 
a part of the budget is expended, and a remaining part is hoarded. Usages of 
the budget are limited to these two because we suppose that money does not 
disappear nor transfer to the outside. Then, the budget constraint in Basic-
term v which is after the first basic-term is denoted 
Xi(v)+Hi(v)=Hi(v−1)+Yi(v−1), 
where Yi(v) is the revenue quantity of Agent i in Basic-term v. Note that the 
time of revenue and expenditure differs in this constraint. This is the 
essence of time irreversible disposal. 
Hereby, the budget constraints of each basic-term have been determined. 
We will also clarify how money possessed at the end of the relevant term is 
decided. Note that hoarding and revenue in the last basic-term cannot be 
expended in the relevant term. They are forced to be possessed at the term 
end. Since the other disposable quantities of money have been already 
included in each budget constraint, they are all of elements of the term end 
possession. Hence, if we let Ωi be a quantity of money which Agent i 
possesses at the end of the relevant term, 
Ωi=Hi(t)+Yi(t), 
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is satisfied. We call this the term end settlement formula. 
A set of the budget constraints of all basic-terms and the settlement 
formula is the irreversibility budget constraint. 
Next, we clarify an assumption regarding individual utility. We assume 
that all individual agents included in the relevant society shared a finite 
planning period. Then, we regard the shared planning period as the relevant 
term. Each individual agent obtains utility from consumption goods 
exchanged in each basic-term included in the relevant term. Therefore, if we 
let Ci(v) be the quantity of consumption goods obtained by Agent i in Basic-
term v, a utility function of Agent i is denoted by Ui[Ci(1),…,Ci(t)]. 
Further, we assume that the utility increases if the quantity of 
consumption goods in each basic-term increases, as far as it does not change 
the quantity of consumption goods in another basic-term. That is, we put 
the assumption of non-satiation of utility regarding consumption. 
Mathematically, the non-satiation of consumption is expressed as 
∂Ui/∂Ci(v)>0 for any Agent i and any Basic-term v. 
Next, we introduce the concept of price. The price of a basic-term is 
defined as the expenditure of the basic-term per unit of consumption goods 
exchanged with the expenditure. Based on this definition, price is always 
positive value as far as exchange is executed. Then, exchange in a basic-
term is assumed to be executed under the common price.  Let P(v) be the 
common price in Basic-term v. The formula Xi(v)=P(v)Ci(v) holds by this 
assumption, and Ci(v)=Xi(v)/P(v) also holds. 
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In this paper, we suppose that price of a basic-term is never affected even 
if expenditure of any basic-term changes.11 Note that this supposition of 
price fixedness does not eliminate a possibility of temporal variation of price.  
Then, we suppose that an effect on real consumption by nominal 
expenditure occurs only through price level. Based on this supposition, we 
derive a relationship between consumption and expenditure.   
Theorem 2.1. ∂Ci(v)/∂Xi(v)>0 holds for any Agent i and any Basic-term v. 
Proof. Due to the formula Ci(v)=Xi(v)/P(v) and the supposition of price 
fixedness, we obtain ∂Ci(v)/∂Xi(v)=1/P(v). Since P(v)>0 holds, ∂Ci(v)/∂Xi(v)>0 is 
satisfied. [Q.E.D.] 
Moreover, we put a supposition that utility obtained from nominal 
expenditure is determined only by utility obtained from real consumption 
which is directly exchanged with the expenditure. Based on this supposition, 
we justify that ∂Ui/∂Xi(v)=(∂Ui/∂Ci(v))(∂Ci(v)/∂Xi(v)) holds between the utility 
function and nominal expenditure. 
Utility regarded as a function of nominal expenditure is called the 
nominal utility function in this paper. We can derive the following theorem 
regarding the nominal utility function. 
Theorem 2.2. ∂Ui/∂Xi(v)>0 holds for any Agent i and any Basic-term v. 
Proof. ∂Ui/∂Ci(v)>0 holds by the non-satiation of consumption, and 
∂Ci(v)/∂Xi(v)>0 holds by Theorem 2.1. Hence, (∂Ui/∂Ci(v))(∂Ci(v)/∂Xi(v))>0 is 
                                                   
11 The author previously planned to release a paper which discusses a case where 
expenditure affects price (See Miura, 2016, p.287), but he does not intend to accomplish 
it now. 
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derived. Since we suppose that ∂Ui/∂Xi(v)=(∂Ui/∂Ci(v))(∂Ci(v)/∂Xi(v)) holds, we 
obtain ∂Ui/∂Xi(v)>0. [Q.E.D.] 
Theorem 2.2 represents that the nominal utility function of an individual 
agent increases monotonically. We call this the monotonicity of the nominal 
utility function. 
 
3. Necessary Condition for Pareto Efficiency 
Although we have discussed the budget constraint of an individual agent 
in the preceding section, the constraint for expenditure can be defined not 
only per individual unit but also in the whole society. We derive the 
irreversibility budget constraint of the whole society by aggregating those of 
all individual agents. However, we decide that the quantities of the whole 
society are denoted by removing subscripts. The constraint is the set of the 
following formulas. 
X(1)+H(1)=Ψ. 
X(v)+H(v)=H(v−1)+Y(v−1). 
Ω=H(t)+Y(t). 
Here, we pay attention to the relationship between expenditure and 
revenue. The irreversibility constraint only expresses a money flow from 
revenue to expenditure but does not express a money flow from expenditure 
to revenue. We call the latter flow the expenditure reflux phenomenon. 
Money can circulate because the both flows exist. Therefore, we have to 
consider the both flows to represent money circulation completely. Such a 
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consideration is indeed the essence of our money circulation optimization. 
Note that expenditure is defined as transferring money to the relevant 
space-time, and revenue is defined as money being transferred from the 
relevant space-time. Hence, the two concepts describe the same event 
namely money transfer grasped from different perspectives. Money 
expended by someone must be received by another. As a result, the sum of 
expenditure and that of revenue are naturally equal. We call this the law of 
transfer equality. Using symbols, this law is denoted as X(v)=Y(v) for any 
Basic-term v. 
This law can also be interpreted as a quantitative expression of the 
expenditure reflux of the whole society (Miura, 2015b, p.98). It represents 
that variation of expenditure causes the same amount of variation of 
revenue in the whole society. The budget constraint manages to represent 
money circulation completely by incorporating the law. Then, we substitute 
the law of transfer equality for the irreversibility budget constraint. It is the 
irreversibility reflux budget constraint of the whole society. Since this name 
is too long, we call it merely the whole budget constraint hereafter. This is 
an authentic monetary budget constraint of the whole society. 
Theorem 3.1. X(v)+H(v)=Ψ, H(v)+Y(v)=Ψ and Ω=Ψ for any Basic-term v. 
Proof. We prove this by mathematical induction. 
In the case v is the first basic-term, X(1)+H(1)=Ψ is immediately derived 
from the budget constraint in the first basic-term. In the case v is a 
following basic-term, we suppose that X(v−1)+H(v−1)=Ψ holds. By this 
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supposition and the law of transfer equality in Basic-term v−1, 
H(v−1)+Y(v−1)=Ψ is satisfied. Substituting this equation for the budget 
constraint in the following basic-term, we can derive X(v)+H(v)=Ψ. Moreover, 
from this formula and the law of transfer equality, we can derive 
H(v)+Y(v)=Ψ. This conclusion and the term end settlement formula derive 
Ω=Ψ. [Q.E.D.] 
Due to Theorem 3.1, the whole budget constraint can be denoted as 
X(v)+H(v)=Ψ for any Basic-term v. Further, expenditure and hoarding are 
non-negative by their economic meaning, thus X(v)≥0 and H(v)≥0 holds. 
Therefore, we can derive 0≤X(v)≤Ψ for any Basic-term v. Hereafter, we 
sometimes indicate this constraint as the whole budget constraint. 
Since we assume that money is not produced nor transferred to the 
outside, Ψ also represents the money stock in the relevant space-time. 
Accordingly, the whole budget constraint is nothing but a constraint by 
money stock of the whole society. 
This constraint is substantially the same as the cash-in-advance 
constraint applied to the whole society.12 However, it should be noted that it 
is not an axiom, but a theorem derived from the irreversibility budget 
constraint and the law of transfer equality. 
If we substituted the law of transfer equality for the budget constraint 
without considering the disposal irreversibility principle, expenditure would 
                                                   
12 The cash-in-advance constraint was primitively suggested by Karl Brunner, and was 
developed by Mario Henrique Simonsen, Robert Wayne Clower and others. (Brunner, 
1951, pp.167-171; Clower, 1967; Boianovsky, 2002). 
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disappear from the constraint. This is a reflection that, if money can be 
disposed time reversibly, agents can continue to expend unlimitedly and 
money can circulate infinitely in a temporally closed place. In this case, 
money stock does not become a constraint for expenditure, and there exists 
a possibility that expenditure is not derived as a finite value. However, the 
irreversibility budget constraint enforces that agents cannot expend 
repeatedly in one basic-term, thus finiteness of expenditure is guaranteed.13 
A constraint for the whole expenditure by money stock is a product of the 
time irreversible disposal in a money circulation structure. 
Careful readers will notice that it also implies the constancy of money 
stock is a product of time irreversibility. We explain this strictly. H(v)+Y(v) 
represents the whole quantity of money which is possessed at the end of 
Basic-term v and at the beginning of Basic-term v+1 (Miura, 2015b, p.94). 
Furthermore, Ω represents money stock at term end. Accordingly, Theorem 
3.1 expresses that the amount of money in the whole society is constant in 
the term beginning quantity Ψ. If our world were time reversible, the same 
money could exist simultaneously, thus we cannot derive the theorem and 
the constancy of money stock cannot be proved. 
You should recognize a significance of the disposal irreversibility principle 
for the money circulation theory. 
Note that the whole budget constraint expresses an expendable range of 
                                                   
13 This is an example of the second missing problem and its solution discussed in Miura 
(2015b). The discussion regarding the jinn particle in a physics world may promote an 
understanding of this issue (Lossev and Novikov, 1992; Gott, 2002, pp.20-24). 
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the whole society constrained by money stock, but this is not a unique 
constraint for the whole expenditure. We assume that money is expended 
only for exchange with consumption goods, thus feasible expenditure is 
constrained by stocks of the exchanged goods. In order to express this 
constraint, we define a real commodity supply set as a combination of 
commodities in each basic-term which can be supplied. 
Moreover, in order to enable us to compare it with nominal expenditure, 
we define a nominal commodity supply set as follows. Let C(v) be the 
quantity of consumption goods aggregated among the whole society in Basic-
term v. Note that C(v)=X(v)/P(v) holds. Based on this, a combination of 
expenditure (X(1),…,X(t)) belongs to the nominal commodity supply set if and 
only if a combination of consumption goods (X(1)/P(1),…, X(t)/P(t)) belongs to 
the real commodity supply set. 
The nominal commodity supply set represents expenditure quantity which 
is needed to exchange supplied commodity. The feasible expenditure of the 
whole society must belong to both the whole budget constraint and the 
nominal supply set. Therefore, we define an intersection of these as a 
feasible expenditure set. 
In the case that X(v)=Ψ holds for any Basic-term v, H(v)=0 also holds for 
any Basic-term v by the whole budget constraint. We call this the non-
hoarding state. If the non-hoarding state is not included into the nominal 
supply set, it does not belong to the feasible expenditure set. In this case, 
money must be hoarded because commodities are sold out even by given low 
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expenditure. We call this undersupplied hoarding. 
Considering X(v)=P(v)C(v) holds, the nominal supply set becomes small if 
price becomes low. On the other hand, the whole budget constraint does not 
vary by a price change. Therefore, commodities are easily sold out if price is 
too low. As a result, undersupplied hoarding is easy to occur. 
Even if undersupplied hoarding occurs, all supplied commodities can be 
consumed. Therefore, this is not a hoarding which brings an economic loss. 
We should pay attention that all types of hoarding do not cause a loss. 
From here, we suppose that the whole budget constraint is always 
included into the nominal commodity supply set. By this supposition, the 
whole budget constraint accords with the feasible expenditure set. This 
supposition concludes that the undersupplied hoarding does not occur. 
Then, we prove the following theorem regarding Pareto efficiency defined 
in the feasible expenditure set. 
Theorem 3.2. We assume that the feasible expenditure set accords with 
the whole budget constraint. Further, price is supposed to be fixed in the 
range of the whole constraint. The non-hoarding state is a necessary 
condition for Pareto efficiency in the feasible expenditure set. 
Proof. Let (X(1)*,…,X(t)*) be a state which satisfies the whole budget 
constraint and in which money is hoarded. In this state, there exists an 
agent who hoards money in a basic-term. Let j be an agent who hoards 
money and w be a basic-term in which Agent j hoards money. Hj(w)*>0 is 
satisfied by this definition. Due to the whole budget constraint and the non-
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negativity of expenditure and hoarding, 0≤(Xj(w)*+Hj(w)*)+∑i≠jXi(w)*≤Ψ holds 
for Basic-term w and 0≤X(v)*≤Ψ holds for any Basic-term v.  
Then, we define a state (X(1)**,…,X(t)**) such that Xi(v)**=Xi(v)* if v≠w or i≠j 
and Xj(w)**=Xj(w)*+Hj(w)*. Note that 0≤X(v)**=X(v)*≤Ψ is satisfied if v≠w and 
0≤(Xj(w)*+Hj(w)*)+∑i≠jXi(w)*=Xj(w)**+∑i≠jXi(w)**≤Ψ is also satisfied. Therefore, 
we can confirm that (X(1)**,…, X(t)**) satisfies the whole budget constraint, 
which accords with the feasible expenditure set. 
Considering Hj(w)*>0 holds, we can derive Xj(w)**=Xj(w)*+Hj(w)*>Xj(w)*. 
Further, Xj(v)**=Xj(v)* is satisfied if v≠w. By Theorem 2.2, we can see that 
Uj[Xj(1)**,…,Xj(t)**]>Uj[Xj(1)*,…,Xj(t)*] holds. On the other hand, Xi(v)**=Xi(v)* 
holds for any Basic-term v and any Agent i excluding Agent j. Theorem 2.2 
implies that utility of an agent does not vary if expenditure of the agent 
does not vary in any basic-term. Hence, Ui[Xi(1)**,…,Xi(t)**]=Ui[Xi(1)*,…,Xi(t)*] 
holds if i≠j. The utility of Agent j in (X(1)**,…,X(t)**) increases than that in 
(X(1)*,…,X(t)*), which represents an arbitrary hoarding state, without 
changing the utilities of the other agents. Therefore, any hoarding state is 
Pareto inefficient in the feasible expenditure set. [Q.E.D.] 
We interpret Theorem 3.2 qualitatively while considering consistency of 
money stock. For example, foods disappear by its use, thus it is beneficial 
that foods are hoarded for the future use. However, money does not 
disappear and it is not degraded by its use in the whole society. Money 
which is once used is transferred to the other and can be used again. Hence, 
hoarding of money is merely a loss of opportunity for use, thus it is an 
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ineffective behavior. 
Note that, if the nominal commodity supply set is included in the whole 
budget constraint, the supply set accords with the feasible expenditure set. 
In this case, a Pareto efficient state in the former set accords with the state 
in the latter set. 
However, we assume that an inclusion relation between the supply set 
and the whole budget constraint is opposite. The two efficient states can 
accord even if our assumed inclusion relation holds, but it is not always 
valid. There is a possibility that the two efficient states are different. The 
Pareto efficiency in the supply set is a pure efficiency of real consumption, 
but feasibility of this efficiency can be blocked because the money stock in 
the whole society is too short to execute expenditure needed to purchase all 
supplied commodities. We call this economic loss a money shortage loss. 
Considering X(v)=P(v)C(v) holds, the nominal supply set becomes large if 
price becomes high level. On the other hand, the whole budget constraint 
does not vary by a price change. Therefore, the supply set is hard to be 
included in the whole budget constraint if price is too high. As a result, the 
money shortage loss is easy to occur. 
The money shortage loss is a cause of under-consumption, but it is not its 
unique cause. Even if the money shortage loss does not exist, another 
economic loss can occur because of hoarding. Hereafter, we examine this 
possibility. 
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4. Various Causes of Hoarding 
The non-hoarding state is a necessary condition for Pareto efficiency in 
our primitive economy. Then, is there a possibility that agents hoard money 
and an economic loss is brought? In order to pursue a possibility of this 
hoarding loss, we aim to examine causes of hoarding. 
As mentioned above, we eliminate a possibility of the undersupplied 
hoarding. If we accept this possibility, we can explain the existence of 
hoarding. However, all supplied commodities can be consumed even if this 
hoarding occurs, thus it is not a hoarding which brings an economic loss. In 
order to found the hoarding loss, we should pursue another cause of 
hoarding. 
We can doubt the assumption of the non-satiation of consumption. A 
satiation of consumption can be realistic, and there may be an agent whose 
utility is satiated in a medium of the budget constraint. In this case, they 
hoard money because their utility is not increased through more 
expenditure. However, since this satiated hoarding does not bring a 
decrease of utility, it is not also an economic loss. 
Note that realization of exchange is not guaranteed only by the existences 
of potential buyer and seller. Feasible expenditure is constrained by many 
environmental conditions such as a bodily condition, a geographical 
condition, a communication condition, a linguistic condition and a political 
condition (Miura, 2015b, pp.89-90). Nevertheless, these environmental 
constraints have never been considered yet excluding the disposal 
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irreversibility principle. Some of these may make agents be impossible to 
exchange money. In this case, agents are forced to hoard money. 
Since many environment constraints do not seem to affect utility, they 
may be able to found the hoarding loss. Nevertheless, there seems to be 
some environment constraints which affect a utility. For example, human 
beings need not any food if they can live without eating, and they will not 
desire any car if they need not move anywhere. If these living conditions of 
human beings change, they would tend to hoard easily. Such an 
environmental hoarding is a kind of the satiated hoardings, thus it cannot 
found the hoarding loss. 
Even if environment constraints do not affect utility and an 
environmental hoarding brings an economic loss, the hoarding is hard to be 
called a form of hoarding based on a positive intention. Not only the 
environmental hoarding but also the undersupplied hoarding and the 
satiated hoarding are not caused by abstinent intention. The paradox of 
thrift is called a paradox because saving is regarded as a virtue based on an 
abstinent intention. Hence, for an explanation of the paradox of thrift, we 
should explain the existence of hoarding by an intentional abstinent. 
Until now, we have assumed that hoarding does not bring utility. If we 
change this assumption and incorporate hoarding in the utility function 
similar to the idea of the money-in-the-utility function (Feenstra, 1992; 
Walsh, 2003, pp.43-59), we will be able to explain the existence of the 
intentional hoarding easily. 
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However, in the case that hoarding is included in the individual utility, it 
seems to be difficult to regard the hoarding as an economic loss. But we 
should not lightly judge so because situations which environ an individual 
and a society can be different. We ought to examine relationships between 
individual utility and social welfare considering this difference of both 
situations. In order to judge this issue, we need to think about a ground of 
justifiability that hoarding brings utility. 
What is a feature of that hoarding gives utility? It is not a utility obtained 
from a future consumption because it is already included in the utility 
function. There exists a fact that some people collect rare coins and bills as a 
hobby. In this case, it is not doubtful that they obtain utility from hoarding. 
Some people may hoard money based on asceticism morality. This can also 
be interpreted as one of the cases that hoarding gives utility. If hoarding 
occurs by these reasons, it ought to be considered in social welfare, thus it is 
inappropriate to found the hoarding loss. For the purpose, we must search 
for another reason. 
Paul Davidson justified the utility of money by an uncertainty (Davidson, 
2012, p.354). It can be one of main reasons of hoarding, and there exist 
research works of the precautionary saving, which is a saving based on 
uncertainty (Kimball, 1990; Carroll and Kimball, 2008). If uncertainty is 
caused by relationships between others, it is inherent to individual agents. 
Accordingly, there may be no problem even if hoarding is not considered in 
social welfare. 
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Uncertainty seems to be a kind of individual irrationality. We do not deny 
that the individual irrationality including uncertainty is an important issue 
for understanding a realistic economy. It is worthy of note that Bruce 
Greenwald and Joseph Stiglitz showed that incomplete information or 
incomplete markets are not Pareto efficient (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986). 
However, if the hoarding loss is caused only by individual irrationalities, the 
loss would disappear when individual intelligence improves to the 
maximum. 
But in fact, a society can be irrational even if individual agents are 
entirely rational. The improvement of individual intelligence will not 
perfectly solve an economic loss. There exists a limitation to a solution of 
social irrationality by individual rationality. In order to show it, we 
strategically adopt an assumption of rational agents with perfect 
information. The same as before, we assume that hoarding is not included in 
the utility function for a definite foundation of the hoarding loss. Then, we 
will search for occurrence conditions of abstinent hoarding by an individual 
exercising rational judgment. 
 
5. Foundation of Hoarding Loss 
Our money circulation optimization is an optimal method of expenditure 
which reflects two money flows between expenditure and revenue. The flow 
from revenue to expenditure is expressed as an expenditure optimization 
under the budget constraint, which includes revenue. The flow from 
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expenditure to revenue is expressed by the law of transfer equality, which is 
a quantitative expression of the whole expenditure reflux. Based on this 
idea, an individual optimal solution of the money circulation optimization is 
defined as an expenditure optimal solution by an individual decision-making 
which is consistent with the law of transfer equality. 
First, we examine an individual decision-making. We already confirmed 
the monotonicity of the nominal utility function in Theorem 2.2. That is, 
∂Ui/∂Xi(v)>0  holds for any Agent i and any Basic-term v. Moreover, we add 
two new suppositions to the nominal marginal utility. 
First, we suppose that the nominal marginal utility is diminishing. 
Mathematically, this supposition is denoted by ∂2Ui/∂Xi(v)2<0 for any Agent i 
and any Basic-term v. 
Second, we suppose that the nominal marginal utility of a basic-term is 
independent of expenditure of another basic-term. Mathematically, this 
supposition is denoted by ∂2Ui/∂Xi(v)Xi(w)=0 between different Basic-terms v 
and w for any Agent i. Due to this supposition, nominal marginal utility of a 
basic-term is only a function of expenditure of the same basic-term. Based 
on this, we can denote the nominal marginal utility as ∂Ui/∂Xi(v)=Ui(v)[Xi(v)]. 
Next, we consider the budget constraint which each individual agent faces. 
For a simple analysis, we ignore environmental constraints excluding the 
disposal irreversibility principle. Further, we have to consider causality 
between expenditure and revenue for an individual agent. 
If an individual agent expends, their revenue is not guaranteed to 
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increase. Inversely, even if the individual agent receives money, they do not 
need to expend it. Therefore, expenditure and revenue are two different 
events for an individual agent. Based on this, we assume that the individual 
agent maximizes their utility under the irreversibility budget constraint 
with recognition that expenditure does not affect revenue.14 
Eventually, Agent i maximizes Ui[Xi(1),…,Xi(t)] subject to Xi(1)+Hi(1)=Ψi and 
Xi(v)+Hi(v)=Hi(v−1)+Yi(v−1) such that v≥2. In addition, the non-negativity 
constraints, Xi(v)≥0 and Hi(v)≥0, must hold for any Basic-term v.  
Expenditure and hoarding are both variables of this optimization. We aim 
to delete the latter variable. Adding up constraints from the first basic-term 
to Basic-term v, we obtain the following formula. 
Xi(1)+… +Xi(v−1)+Xi(v)+Hi(v)=Ψi+Yi(1)+…+Yi(v−1).15 
We replace this with the constraint in Basic-term v. Applying the non-
negativity constraint of Hi(v) to this constraint, we can derive 
Xi(1)+…+Xi(v−1)+Xi(v)≤Ψi+Yi(1)+…+Yi(v−1). 
Agent i maximizes Ui[Xi(1),…,Xi(t)] under this constraint and the non-
negativity of expenditure applied to all basic-terms. A solution of this 
maximum problem is necessary to satisfy the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) 
                                                   
14 In reality, the expenditure reflux occurs also in an individual unit, thus expenditure 
of an individual agent affects revenue of the same agent. Based on this recognition, the 
author suggested the irreversibility reflux budget constraint of an individual agent 
(Miura, 2015b, p.98). However, the constraint was schemed as a normative constraint 
not as a realistic constraint. Since an empirical recognition of the individual reflux is 
too difficult, any real agent does not seem to make their decision considering the reflux. 
Therefore, our supposition that the individual budget constraint does not incorporate 
the expenditure reflux seems to be appropriate for a realistic decision-making. 
15 This is an original formula which is used to derive the irreversibility budget 
constraint (Miura, 2015b, pp.94-95). 
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conditions.16 We aim to clarify these conditions concretely. 
We define a Lagrangian function of Agent i as follows. 
     Li=Ui[Xi(1),…,Xi(t)] 
          +∑v∈Tλi(v)(Ψi+Yi(1)+…+Yi(v−1)−Xi(1)−…−Xi(v−1)−Xi(v))+∑v∈Tθi(v)Xi(v) 
Note that λi(v) and θi(v) refer to the Lagrange multipliers. Let Xi(v)* be an 
optimal solution of Xi(v). By the KKT conditions, we obtain 
Ui(v)[Xi(v)*]=λi(v)+…+λi(t)−θi(v), 
Xi(1)*+…+Xi(v−1)*+Xi(v)*≤Ψi+Yi(1)+…+Yi(v−1), Xi(v)*≥0 
λi(v)(Ψi+Yi(1)+…+Yi(v−1)−Xi(1)*−…−Xi(v−1)*−Xi(v)*)=0, 
θi(v)Xi(v)*=0, λi(v)≥0, θi(v)≥0. 
Theorem 5.1. λi(t)>0 for any Agent i. 
Proof. Ui(t)[Xi(t)*]=λi(t)−θi(t) holds by the KKT condition, and Ui(t)[Xi(t)*]>0 is 
satisfied by the monotonicity of utility in Theorem 2.2. Therefore, we obtain 
λi(t)>θi(t). Since θi(t)≥0 holds by the KKT condition, λi(t)>0 is derived. [Q.E.D.] 
In order to simplify an analysis, we hereafter assume that θi(v)=0 holds 
generally. This assumption requests that the non-negativity of expenditure 
does not become an active constraint. If it becomes an active constraint, 
Xi(v)*=0 must hold. We require that expenditure of all agents in any basic-
term ought to be derived as a positive value. This does not seem so 
unnatural assumption because any agents need to expend money a little as 
far as they continue to live in relevant space-time.17 
                                                   
16 Regarding the general KKT conditions, refer to texts of mathematical optimization 
theory including Bertsekas (1999, p.316). 
17 Someone may object like this. Human beings have to live with doing other than 
trading. They also have to sleep. Hence, any human beings have a time not to expend 
money. This objection is realistically appropriate. Yet, we declare that we ignore 
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Based on this, we can prove the following theorem. 
Theorem 5.2. Let v<w. Ui(v)[Xi(v)*]≥Ui(w)[Xi(w)*] holds generally. Moreover, 
Ui(v)[Xi(v)*]=Ui(w)[Xi(w)*] holds if and only if λi(r)=0 for v≤r≤w−1. 
Proof. From the KKT conditions considering θi(v)=θi(w)=0, we can derive 
Ui(v)[Xi(v)*]−Ui(w)[Xi(w)*]=λi(v)+…+λi(w−1). 
Since all Lagrange multipliers are always non-negative by the KKT 
conditions, Ui(v)[Xi(v)*]≥Ui(w)[Xi(w)*] holds generally. Further, if λi(r)=0 holds for 
v≤r≤w−1 generally, it is obvious that Ui(v)[Xi(v)*]=Ui(w)[Xi(w)*] holds. If there 
exists r such that λi(r)>0, considering with the non-negativity of all Lagrange 
multipliers, Ui(v)[Xi(v)*]>Ui(w)[Xi(w)*] is satisfied. [Q.E.D.] 
As mentioned above, the optimal solution of the money circulation 
optimization must be consistent with the law of transfer equality. In order to 
secure the consistency, we aggregate the individual optimal solutions and 
apply the law of transfer equality to the aggregated solution. 
Note that the whole budget constraint is derived from the aggregated 
irreversibility budget constraint and the law of transfer equality. 
Accordingly, the aggregated solution must also satisfy the whole budget 
constraint for the optimal solution is consistent with the law of transfer 
equality. 
Let X(v)* and H(v)* be aggregated optimal solutions of expenditure and 
hoarding. We can prove the following theorems regarding the aggregated 
solutions. 
                                                                                                                                                     
environmental constraints excluding time irreversible disposal in p.25 of this paper, 
thus we believe that we can evade such an objection. 
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Theorem 5.3. In any Basic-term v, if λi(v)>0 holds for any Agent i, X(v)*=Ψ 
and H(v)*=0 are satisfied. 
Proof. By the KKT conditions, the assumption derives that 
Ψi+Yi(1)+…+Yi(v−1)−Xi(1)*−…−Xi(v−1)*−Xi(v)*=0, 
holds for any Agent i. Aggregating this equation of all agents, we obtain 
Ψ+Y(1)+…+Y(v−1)−X(1)*−…−X(v−1)*−X(v)*=0. 
Further, Y(w)=X(w)* for 1≤w≤v−1 holds by the law of transfer equality. As a 
result, X(v)*=Ψ is derived. Moreover, since H(v)*=Ψ−X(v)* holds because of 
the whole budget constraint, we can also derive H(v)*=0. [Q.E.D.] 
Theorem 5.4. X(t)*=Ψ and H(t)*=0. 
Proof. This is derived from Theorems 5.1 and 5.3. [Q.E.D.] 
Theorem 5.4 shows that anyone does not hoard money at all in an optimal 
state of the last basic-term. This is intuitively because hoarding of the last 
basic-term cannot be expended in the planning period any more thus it is 
judged as ineffective. If agents set one basic-term for the planning period, 
the relevant term consists of only the last basic-term, so Theorem 5.4 
represents that anyone does not hoard money in this case. We can see that 
the hoarding loss does not occur if all expenditure plans are executed 
momentarily. Yet, humans are beings living in a long time, thus momentary 
expenditure planning is worthless to consider. Hereafter, we examine a case 
where the planning period consists of plural basic-terms. 
In order to simplify an analysis, we introduce a new supposition that the 
Lagrange multipliers of the same basic-term share a sign among all agents. 
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That is, λi(v)=0 holds for any Agent i if there exists Agent j such that λj(v)=0, 
and λi(v)>0 holds for any Agent i if there exists Agent j such that λj(v)>0. 
Then, we define some types of time preference regarding expenditure by 
comparing nominal marginal utilities of different basic-terms obtained from 
the same amount of expenditure. We will classify agents into three time 
preference types. 
Let v<w hold. 
If Ui(v)[X]>Ui(w)[X] is satisfied, past expenditure gives larger marginal 
utility than future expenditure at an expenditure level X. In this case, it is 
defined as Agent i preferring past expenditure between Basic-terms v and w 
at an expenditure level X. 
If Ui(v)[X]<Ui(w)[X] is satisfied, future expenditure gives larger marginal 
utility than past expenditure at an expenditure level X. In this case, it is 
defined as Agent i preferring future expenditure between Basic-terms v and 
w at an expenditure level X. 
If Ui(v)[X]=Ui(w)[X] holds, past expenditure and future expenditure gives 
the same marginal utility at an expenditure level X. In this case, it is 
defined as Agent i preferring expenditure time neutrally between Basic-
terms v and w at an expenditure level X.  
Then, we suppose a uniformity of time preference regarding expenditure 
level. This uniformity means that time preference does not depend on the 
expenditure level. If an agent in a basic-term prefers the past expenditure 
at an expenditure level, the agent also prefers the past expenditure in any 
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another expenditure level. In the case that the agent prefers the future or 
time neutrality, the same relationship is supposed. Uniformity may not be 
appropriate in reality, but this paper supposes to simplify analysis. 
Based on the supposition of the uniformity, the individual agent is called a 
past preference type if the agent prefers past expenditure. Moreover, the 
agent is called a future preference type if the agent prefers future 
expenditure, and the agent is called a time neutral preference type if the 
agent prefers expenditure time neutrally. 
This paper analyzes a case where all agents have similar preference. In 
this case, we can derive the following theorems. 
Theorem 5.5. Assume that there exist Basic-terms v and w such that v<w, 
X(w)*=Ψ holds, and time preference type of all agents between v and w is the 
time neutral preference type. Moreover, if there exists Basic-term r such 
that v+1≤r≤w−1, λi(r)=0 is assumed to be all satisfied. In this case, λi(v)=0, 
X(v)*=Ψ and H(v)*=0 hold. 
Proof. We first prove that there exists an agent such that λi(v)=0 by 
reduction ad absurdum. Suppose that λi(v)>0 holds for all agents. From 
Theorem 5.2, Ui(v)[Xi(v)*]>Ui(w)[Xi(w)*] holds for any Agent i. Since all agents 
are assumed to be the neutral preference type between Basic-term v and w, 
Ui(w)[Xi(v)*]=Ui(v)[Xi(v)*]>Ui(w)[Xi(w)*]=Ui(v)[Xi(w)*] 
holds generally. Due to the diminishment of  marginal utility, the conditions 
Ui(w)[Xi(v)*]>Ui(w)[Xi(w)*] and Ui(v)[Xi(v)*]>Ui(v)[Xi(w)*] derive Xi(v)*<Xi(w)*. This 
inequality is satisfied in any agents. Aggregating these inequalities of all 
32 
 
agents, we obtain X(v)*<X(w)*. Since X(w)*≤Ψ holds generally by the whole 
budget constraint, X(v)*<Ψ is derived. However, the supposition λi(v)>0 for all 
agents derives X(v)*=Ψ by Theorem 5.3. This is a contradiction. The 
supposition is denied by reduction ad absurdum. 
Based on the sharing the sign of Lagrange multiplier, a remained 
possibility is λi(v)=0 for all agents. Considering that λi(r)=0 is assumed to be 
all satisfied for v+1≤r≤w−1, λi(r)=0 holds for any v≤r≤w−1. From Theorem 5.2, 
Ui(v)[Xi(v)*]=Ui(w)[Xi(w)*] holds for any Agent i. All agents are assumed to be 
the neutral preference type between Basic-term v and w, thus 
Ui(w)[Xi(v)*]=Ui(v)[Xi(v)*]=Ui(w)[Xi(w)*]=Ui(v)[Xi(w)*] 
holds generally. Due to the diminishment of  marginal utility, the conditions 
Ui(w)[Xi(v)*]=Ui(w)[Xi(w)*] and Ui(v)[Xi(v)*]=Ui(v)[Xi(w)*] derive Xi(v)*=Xi(w)*. This 
equation is satisfied in any agents. Aggregating these equations of all agents, 
we obtain X(v)*=X(w)*. Since X(w)*=Ψ is assumed, we obtain X(v)*=Ψ. 
Moreover, H(v)*=0 is derived by the whole budget constraint. [Q.E.D.] 
Theorem 5.6. Assume that there exist Basic-terms v and w such that v<w, 
and X(w)*=Ψ holds. Further, all agents are the time neutral or past 
preference type between v and w, and at least one agent is the latter type. 
Moreover, if there exists Basic-term r such that v+1≤r≤w−1, λi(r)=0 is 
assumed to be all satisfied. In this case, λi(v)>0, X(v)*=Ψ and H(v)*=0 hold. 
Proof. We prove λi(v)>0 for any Agent i by reduction ad absurdum. 
According to the sharing the sign of Lagrange multiplier, we suppose λi(v)=0 
holds for any agent. Considering that λi(r)=0 is assumed to be all satisfied for 
33 
 
v+1≤r≤w−1, λi(r)=0 holds for any v≤r≤w−1. Due to Theorem 5.2, 
Ui(v)[Xi(v)*]=Ui(w)[Xi(w)*] holds for any Agent i. All agents are assumed to be 
the neutral or past preference type between Basic-term v and w, thus 
Ui(w)[Xi(v)*]≤Ui(v)[Xi(v)*]=Ui(w)[Xi(w)*]≤Ui(v)[Xi(w)*] 
holds for any Agent i, and there exists Agent j such that 
Uj(w)[Xj(v)*]<Uj(v)[Xj(v)*]=Uj(w)[Xj(w)*]<Uj(v)[Xj(w)*] 
Due to these and the diminishment of marginal utility, we can derive 
Xi(v)*≥Xi(w)* for any Agent i and Xj(v)*>Xj(w)* for one Agent j. Aggregating 
these inequalities of all agents, we obtain X(v)*>X(w)*. Since X(w)*=Ψ is 
assumed, X(v)*>Ψ holds, but this contradicts the whole budget constraint. 
λi(v)>0 for any agents has been proved by reduction ad absurdum and the 
sharing of the sign of Lagrange multiplier. X(v)*=Ψ and H(v)*=0 is derived 
from this proved proposition and Theorem 5.3. [Q.E.D.] 
Note that X(t)*=Ψ is satisfied by Theorem 5.4. Hence, Theorems 5.5 and 
5.6 seem to clarify that hoarding never occurs if agents are the time neutral 
or past preference type. However, should we accept this conclusion simply? 
Suppose that all assumptions of Theorem 5.5 hold. As shown in the proof 
of the theorem, Xi(v)*=Xi(w)* holds for all agents. Also by the theorem, 
Hi(v)*=Hi(w)*=0 holds generally. Hence, Xi(v)*+Hi(v)*=Xi(w)*+Hi(w)* is satisfied 
for any agents. Since the sum of expenditure and hoarding in the same 
basic-term accords with the budget of the term,18 this conclusion means that 
budgets of the two basic-terms must be equal in all agents. 
                                                   
18 See pp.9-10 of this paper. 
34 
 
Yet, this seems to be an extremely rare case. The budget in each basic-
term ought to be decided depending on an initial state and distribution.19 
Why have we derived such a rare case? It seems to be because of our 
supposition that all agents share a sign of Lagrange multipliers. We rethink 
this supposition. Due to the KKT conditions, a value of Lagrange multiplier 
connects with that of marginal utility of optimal state. Hence, the 
supposition seems to request a kind of homogeneity of situation among all 
agents. As a result, the supposition may make it impossible to analyze an 
effect of distribution. 
This supposition of homogeneity seems to be similar to the so-called 
assumption of the representative agent. Although it is widely used in 
contemporary macroeconomics, there exists critique against it (Kirman, 
1992; Carroll, 2000; An et al., 2009). It has an advantage of simple analysis, 
thus we also adopted it for an introductory explanation for our money 
circulation optimization (Miura, 2016). However, we should also recognize 
that the representative agent model makes it impossible to analyze an effect 
of distribution. In addition, it tends to blind us to difference in situation 
between an individual and society. This difference is indeed the essence of 
hoarding loss we intend to prove.20 For more advanced research of economic 
theory, we should abandon the representative agent model. 
We will get back on track. If we accept that Lagrange multipliers can be 
                                                   
19 This is implied by the solution of the money circulation equation regarding the end 
money (Miura, 2014, p.192). 
20 When we used the representative agent as an introduction of hoarding loss, we 
warned you not to lose sight of this difference (Miura, 2016, p.274). 
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different signs, there still exists a possibility that some agents hoard money. 
We should not judge that hoarding never occurs if agents prefer time 
neutrality by the preceding theorems. This is also the same in the case that 
they prefer the past expenditure. Nevertheless, it is not easy to prove the 
existence of hoarding affected by a distribution in the case of the neutral 
and past preference type.21 
However, if agents prefer the future expenditure, we can prove the 
existence of hoarding without considering a distribution as shown in the 
following theorem. Note that this theorem does not depend on the 
supposition of sharing a sign of Lagrange multipliers. 
Theorem 5.7. Assume that there exist Basic-terms v and w such that v<w 
which satisfy conditions that all agents are the time neutral or future 
preference type between v and w, and at least one agent is the latter type. 
In this case, X(v)*<Ψ and H(v)*>0 hold. 
Proof. Since v<w and Theorem 5.2 hold, Ui(v)[Xi(v)*]≥Ui(w)[Xi(w)*] is satisfied 
generally. Considering this and the supposed conditions, 
Ui(w)[Xi(v)*]≥Ui(v)[Xi(v)*]≥Ui(w)[Xi(w)*]≥Ui(v)[Xi(w)*] 
holds for any Agent i, and there exists Agent j such that 
Uj(w)[Xj(v)*]>Uj(v)[Xj(v)*]≥Uj(w)[Xj(w)*]>Uj(v)[Xj(w)*] 
Due to these and the diminishment of marginal utility, we can derive 
Xi(v)*≤Xi(w)* for any Agent i and Xj(v)*<Xj(w)* for one Agent j. If we aggregate 
                                                   
21 The author already did elementary research into this issue, and he previously 
planned to release a paper about it (See Miura, 2016, p.287). Yet, he does not intend to 
accomplish it now. 
36 
 
these inequalities of all agents, we obtain X(v)*<X(w)*. X(w)*≤Ψ holds 
generally by the whole budget constraint, thus X(v)*<Ψ is derived. Also by 
the whole constraint, we obtain H(v)*>0. [Q.E.D.] 
Theorem 5.7 represents that hoarding occurs without any supposition if 
all agents similarly prefer the future expenditure. On the other hand, 
Theorem 3.2 shows that the non-hoarding state is a necessary condition for 
Pareto efficiency if price is fixed. We can conclude that the Pareto inefficient 
hoarding loss is realized by rational abstinence of individual agents. 
This hoarding loss is directly connected with a decrease of nominal 
expenditure. Nevertheless, the decrease of nominal expenditure corresponds 
to that of real consumption under the fixed price as shown in Theorem 2.1. 
Hence, this is also a realization of under-consumption. 
 
6. Concluding Comments 
We have clarified that hoarding is judged beneficial by individual agents 
but it brings an economic loss to the whole society. This paradoxical 
phenomenon is caused by a qualitative difference of the budget constraint 
between the whole society and an individual agent. This difference depends 
on whether the law of transfer equality is incorporated in the constraint 
beforehand or not. Although the law is considered in the individual optimal 
solution, we must pay attention that it is considered after the optimization, 
not before. This implies that individual agents make a decision with 
ignoring the law subjectively but it still has an effect objectively. 
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Hoarding directly has an effect of increasing the future budget. Hoarding 
occurs together with a decrease of expenditure, but the decrease has no 
effect on the future budget of an individual agent who hoards money. As a 
whole, hoarding has an effect of increasing the future budget. This increase 
of the future budget enables an increase of the future expenditure. Since 
abstinent agents expect such causality, they hoard money. The expectation 
of this causality seems a main reason why saving is regarded as a virtue. 
But as a fact of the whole society, this causality does not exist. Even in the 
whole society, hoarding has a direct effect to increase the future budget. 
Nevertheless, money which someone expends must be received by someone. 
This is a content of the whole expenditure reflux. Due to the reflux, a 
decrease of the whole expenditure, which occurs together with hoarding, 
brings the same decrease of the whole revenue. Since the whole revenue is 
included in the whole future budget, the decrease of revenue has an effect to 
decrease the budget. This effect neutralizes the direct effect of hoarding 
which increases the budget. 
The law of transfer equality is a quantitative expression of the whole 
expenditure reflux. Since the whole budget constraint incorporates the law, 
it considers this neutralization. As the constraint shows, the whole budget is 
always decided only by money stock, and hoarding has no effect to vary the 
whole future budget. Therefore, judged from view of the whole society, it is 
an ineffective behavior which merely misses an opportunity of the past 
expenditure. 
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If individual agents made a decision considering the law of transfer 
equality beforehand, this ineffectiveness would not occur. But as a matter of 
fact, they make a decision ignoring the law despite its objective truthfulness. 
Why do agents ignore the truth? 
For an individual agent, expenditure is a transfer from them to others, 
and revenue is a transfer from others to them. They are separate events. 
Hence, the separateness between expenditure and revenue is certainly a 
truth provided that judged in a private range. Individual agents do not 
make a decision based on an erroneous factual judgment. 
However, this separateness is only an individual truth but not a social 
truth. Grasped from the view of the whole society, expenditure and revenue 
are the same events namely money transfer. A quantitative expression of 
this sameness is nothing but the law of transfer equality. 
The individual separateness and the social sameness between expenditure 
and revenue seem to be a contradiction, but it is a superficial view. The 
reason why they do not contradict is in the existence of others. 
Compatibleness between the individual separateness and the social 
sameness can be explained by a fact that expenditure of an agent is 
certainly separate from their own revenue but is the same as their others’ 
revenue.  
Nevertheless, the interest of selfish individual agents is limited to their 
private range. Accordingly, they forget about a fact that their expenditure 
affects their others’ revenue. Although they consider that their hoarding 
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certainly increases their own utility, they do not consider that the hoarding 
lowers their others’ revenue and decreases the others’ utility. If they are 
pleased that their expenditure raises their others’ revenue and then 
increases the others’ utility just like, increasing in their own utility, the 
hoarding loss would not occur. Yet, selfish agents do not regard their others’ 
utility as their own utility. They take no notice even if their decision 
damages their others. It is the essence of selfish decision-making. 
 Thinking from another point of view, a relational truth among agents 
never reflects in the individual decision-making processes. Individuals are 
rational in the sense that they make a decision while considering a correct 
truth. However, they are irrational in the sense that they do not make a 
decision while considering all truth owing to ignorance of the relational 
truth. As a result, they fall into an irrational situation despite their rational 
judgment. 
Note that we never intend to blame hoarding as a foolish behavior. We ask 
the readers to pay attention to a possibility that, if an individual hoards 
money, their utility can increase though their others’ utility decreases. The 
author himself also hoards money even though he knows the hoarding is a 
cause of social inefficiency. Even if he quits hoarding and expends all of his 
money for efficiency of society, his others do not guarantee his future budget 
which he can gain in the case he hoards money. Expending money 
indiscriminately depletes his future budget and makes him impossible to 
live in the future. As long as a monetary economy is grounded on the 
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principle of personal responsibility, someone’s expenditure behavior for 
social efficiency has a possibility to destroy their life. We never require a 
sacrifice of an individual life for social efficiency. 
A message of our research is that we should grasp a structural problem in 
a monetary economy grounded on personal responsibility. Money is a 
product of the relation namely exchange. Money cannot exist if people live in 
isolation. Then, a fact that contemporary people cannot live without money 
is evidence that they cannot live without others. Nevertheless, their 
decision-makings in a monetary economy are isolated from each other. 
Accordingly, people with personal responsibility are forced to live depending 
on others beyond their control, then coexistence with distrust and 
dependence covers economy and causes social inefficiency. 
This discrepant structure of isolation in relation is not only an essence of 
our monetary economy but also that of our life. An individual human being 
cannot live without others physically, but the others we have to live with are 
a being separated from self psychologically. 
Others are existences who give me fears. However, even if I intend to 
escape from others, they can chase anywhere I can go. Others are also 
existences who give me a favor such as food, cloth, shelter, amusements, and 
love. Nevertheless, they do not always accept my earnest request. 
I must live with others, but the fateful others are beyond my control. My 
fate is forced to be affected by their behavior which I cannot decide. Others’ 
freedom is my unfreedom. I have to live with feeling my powerlessness that 
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I am forced to entrust my life to others. On the other hand, it is your fate 
that you have to accept my choice forced in such an environment even if it 
damages you.  
An invisible wall rises without limit between me and you, who are always 
with me. This structure of isolation in relation is the cause of suffering of 
our life, but it indeed reflects that the human being is not the whole but a 
part of the world. Suffered by its other parts, a partial existence becomes 
conscious of its essence that it is a partial existence, namely it is not God. 
This consciousness may be a fate which God imposes on me. 
I must live this fate as a non-divine being. 
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